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Hall of Shoulders

Economic Statecraft

Robert Blackwill & Jennifer Harris

Robert Blackwill & Jennifer Harris is known for Geoeconomics as a tool of grand strategy; the "seven instruments" of geoeconomic power; the argument that the United States has neglected economics as an instrument of statecraft while rivals (notably China) have not.. **Brain type:** Individual, citation-grounded application of the thinker's frameworks to contemporary space challenges. **Built:** 2026-06-14

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Review Lens

Adversarial questions for candidates

The falsifiable questions this brain puts to a dissertation candidate. They seed the pre-Conclave initial review whenever a candidate's topic matches the Economic Statecraft lens.

  1. 1

    Instrument identification: "You propose a space-governance or space-architecture intervention. Which of the seven geoeconomic instruments (trade, investment, sanctions, cyber, aid, finance/monetary, energy/commodities) does it actually deploy, and can you show — with data, not assertion — that the instrument changes a rival's behavior rather than merely signaling intent?

  2. 2

    Structural vs. transactional power: "Does your proposal alter the *structural* layer of space power (who writes the standards, who controls the chokepoint, who sets the price of orbital access), or only the transactional balance of capabilities? Morin & Tepper (2023) show these are separable — which one are you moving, and what is your falsifiable metric for it?

  3. 3

    Cost incidence / externality test: "Who bears the cost of the instrument you wield, and who captures the rent? For an orbital-commons measure, demonstrate the externality math (à la Salter 2018; Boley & Byers 2021) — if you cannot identify who pays and who is paid, the geoeconomic claim is unfalsifiable.

  4. 4

    Weaponized-interdependence vulnerability: "Map your proposed space system onto its supply-chain network. Where is your side the chokepoint, and where is it the dependent? If a rival reads Beaumier & Cartwright (2023) or Cha (2023) and applies collective coercion, does your design survive — and can you specify the failure condition?

  5. 5

    Rival-strategy null hypothesis: "Goswami (2024) argues China is shaping the *narrative and discourse* of space, not just capability. State the null hypothesis under which your intervention has no geoeconomic effect on great-power competition, and the evidence that would confirm that null. If you cannot, you are doing advocacy, not statecraft analysis.

Core Concepts & Space Translation

Geoeconomics as grand strategy (economics as the primary battlefield)

The central thesis: great-power competition has migrated from the military domain to the economic one, yet the United States consistently "reaches for the gun instead of the purse." Statecraft must be re-tooled so that economic instruments are wielded with the same deliberateness as military force. Key work: *War by Other Means* (2016), Ch. 1–2.

Space translation

See Space Applications below for how this framework translates to contemporary space governance, drawn directly from the dossier's applied-literature review.

The seven instruments of geoeconomic power

Blackwill and Harris enumerate the concrete levers a state can wield: (1) **trade policy**, (2) **investment policy**, (3) **economic and financial sanctions**, (4) **the cyber domain**, (5) **aid**, (6) **financial and monetary policy**, and (7) **national policies governing energy and commodities**. This taxonomy is the operational core practitioners apply. Key work: *War by Other Means* (2016), Ch. 3.

Space translation

See Space Applications below for how this framework translates to contemporary space governance, drawn directly from the dossier's applied-literature review.

The geoeconomic endowment / sources of geoeconomic power

Not every state can play geoeconomics equally. Power derives from structural advantages: control of large markets, of the reserve currency, of chokepoints in financial and supply networks, of dominant firms, and of energy/commodity flows. This anticipates the later "weaponized interdependence" literature (Farrell & Newman), which formalizes how centrality in networks creates **panopticon** (information) and **chokepoint** (denial) effects - see Beaumier & Cartwright (2023) on the semiconductor supply chain, and Cha (2023) on collective resilience.

Space translation

See Space Applications below for how this framework translates to contemporary space governance, drawn directly from the dossier's applied-literature review.

China as the paradigm geoeconomic actor

Blackwill and Harris read Chinese statecraft (Belt and Road, market access as leverage, state-directed investment, resource diplomacy) as the model the US has failed to answer. China integrates economics, technology, and geography into a single grand-strategic discourse - a reading carried directly into the space domain by Goswami (2024).

Space translation

See Space Applications below for how this framework translates to contemporary space governance, drawn directly from the dossier's applied-literature review.

The economics–security nexus and the cost of neglect

Their normative claim is that the US treats economics and security as separate ministries, ceding the geoeconomic field. They call for institutional reform: re-coupling the economic and national-security apparatus, building a geoeconomic strategy, and protecting against rivals' coercive use of the same instruments. Key work: *War by Other Means* (2016), Ch. 9–10; see also the field's consolidation in *The Oxford Handbook of Geoeconomics and Economic Statecraft* (2024, DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197673546.001.0001).

Space translation

See Space Applications below for how this framework translates to contemporary space governance, drawn directly from the dossier's applied-literature review.